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Abstract 
Political institutions are recently pointed out as one of the important factors in the economic growth process. 
This article investigates in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) the direct and indirect 
economic growth effect of three political indicators: Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, rule 
of law, and voice and accountability. The Dynamic Common Correlated Mean Group Estimator results show that 
investing in the rule of law increases economic growth in the WAEMU, while political stability and absence of 
violence and terrorism, and voice and accountability have no direct effect on economic growth in this zone. 
However, the indirect effect through physical and human capital results indicate that the political variables affect 
positively economic growth through human capital and negatively through physical capital. The final indirect 
economic growth effect are negative due to the dominant relative magnitudes effect of physical capital (negative) 
on the human capital effect (positive). 
Keywords: Economic Growth, Political Institution, Dynamic Common Correlated Estimator 
 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed  to the Central Bank of 
West African States. 
1. Introduction 
In the economic growth literature, Acemoglou and Robison (2012) show recently that the most democratic 
countries are, endowed with inclusive economic and political institutions, the most its enjoy a durable prosperity, 
while extractive authoritarian regimes lead to poverty. Some authors have also highlighted the importance of 
political institutions in the economic growth process. Alesina et al. (1993) prove empirically that in countries 
with high political instability, economic growth is significantly lower than otherwise, as well as Kostakis (2014) 
shows that political indicators, such as corruption, rule of law, and government effectiveness have a high impact 
on economic growth. 
This raises the questions whether certain types of government institutions might help reduce this 
uncertainty (Stasavage, 2002). 
Others authors prove that political institutions may have an indirect rather than direct effect on 
economic growth, through internal and foreign investments attracting (Hkson, 2010). Alesina and Perotti (1985) 
indicate that socio-political instability, by creating uncertainty in the politico-economic environment, reduces 
investment, hence economic growth. The others importants channels through which political indicators affect 
economic growth are human capital formation (Klomp and De Haan, 2009; Outreville, 1999), and technical 
efficiency improving or the productivity growth rates (Aisen and Veiga, 2011). 
However, this theory and it's empirical evidence find difficulty to explain the long economic growth 
experienced by some countries over the last thirty years, notably China, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, the 
so called Asian Dragons. 
Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) conclude that there is no clear evidence that democracy foster 
economic growth. Zouhaier & Karim (2012) prove that there is no effect of political instability on investment 
and economic growth in the Middle East and North Africa, but their results show a negative and statistically 
significant effect of the interaction between political instability and investment on economic growth. 
Political institutions improving may, in the first time, increases economic growth. It well knows that 
economic growth generates complex changes in society, and instability such as political. As a consequence, 
economic growth could lead to political instability if the political system is not well-established. 
The "vicious circle" relationship of political institutions and economic growth is also possible. Thus, 
Ahmed and Pulok (2013) show that political stability has negative effect on economic performance in the long-
run, while the short-run effect is positive. Goldsmith also finds the same result by testing Mancur Olson's theory 
of political stability and economic growth. In addiction, Abeyasingbe (2004) indicates that democracy has a 
negative effect on economic growth in developing countries, but the political stability, regardless of the level of 
democracy, has the greatest effect on a country's economic growth. 
Despite existent studies find ambiguous results when testing for the relationship between political 
institutions and economic growth, there is little research that has attempted to examine this relationship in the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). 
This article extends the literature by investigating the political institutions and economic growth 
relationship in this region. It tests two hypotheses: Political institutions'investment is positively related to 
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economic growth due to its effect on the total factor productivity (direct effect), and political 
institutions'improving, by promote investment and human capital formation, increases economic growth (indirect 
effect). 
To do so, this article offers an overview of the empirical framework in the next section. Section three 
presents results and discussion, and concluding remarks are provided in the last section. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
2.1. Model Specification and Estimation Techniques 
Our economic growth equation is based on the dynamic panel augmented Solow model in the style of Jones 
(2015), but with the dynamic common correlated effects. It allows accounting for both unobserved dependence 
between countries and heterogeneous factor. This equation is  specified as follows. 
y i , t= α i+ λ i y i , t− 1+ γ i Poli ,t+βi X i ,t+µ i ,t  
 (1) 
µi ,t= θi f t+ εi , t  
yi,t represent the natural logarithmic form of the real gross domestic product per capita (Log_gdpc) of 
country i in time t. Pol is the political institutions indicators. It's computed by three variables: Political stability 
and absence of violence and terrorism (Pol_stab), rule of law (Ru_law), and voice and accountability (Voi_acc). 
X is a set of control variables, such as physical (Ck) and human (Hc) capital, and the population growth rate 
(Pop). Human capital is computed by the enrollment rate primary education and the physical capital is proxy by 
the gross capital formation as a share of gross domestic product. The heterogeneous coefficients are randomly 
distributed around a common mean, λi = λ + ν0i, γi = γ + ν1i, βi = β + ν2i, where ν0i, ν1i, and ν2i are independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d) with mean zero and finite variance σ20, σ21, and σ22, respectivelly. ft is an 
unobserved common factors and θi a heterogeneous factor. 
Chudik and Pesaran (2015) prove that in this specification case, the idiosyncratic ui,t are cross-
sectionally weakly dependent. They proposed to transform equation (1) to equation (2) as follows in order to 
gain consistency in the estimator. 
yi ,t= α i+ λ i yi , t− 1+ γ i Pol i ,t+ βi X i , t+∑
0
pt
δi ,l ̄ zt− 1+ εi ,t
, 
 (2) 
where zt = (yt-1, Polt, Xt) and pT is the number of lags. 
When all explanatory variables coefficients are constrained to be the same across countries,  αi = α, λi = λ, 
γi = γ, and βi = β, the equation (3) is obtained as follows. 
yi ,t= α+ λ yi ,t− 1+ γ Pol i ,t+ βX i , t+∑
0
pt
δi ,l ̄zt− 1+ εi ,t
 
 (3) 
Equations (2) and (3) are estimated with the Dynamic Common Correlated Mean Group Estimator (See 
Ditzen, 2016 for more details) and Hausman specification test is performed to obtain the efficient and consistent 
estimator according to data feature. To check for the robustness of the model, Fisher statistic, R-squared adjusted, 
and CD test statistic (which check for errors terms weak cross-sectional dependence) are performed. 
 
2.2. Data Description 
The data set consist of annual observations from 1996 to 2014 and cover seven member countries of the 
WAEMU region: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Guinea-Bissau is 
excluded due to data availability. Real gross domestic product per  capita, gross capital formation, enrollment 
rate of primary education, and the population growth have been gained from the World Development Indicators 
data base. Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, rule of law, and voice and accountability 
were obtained from the data set of the World Governance Indicators (See Appendix for details). 
 
3. Results, Analysis and Discussion 
Results are reported in table 1 and 2. Its indicate that the constraint models are the efficient and consistent 
specifications under the null hypothesis, according to the Hausman's specification test. In addition, all constraint 
models are robust. The calculated Fisher statistics are statistically significant at the level of one percent for all 
specifications. Moreover, the R-squared adjusted is averaged to 85 percent, implying that models's explanatories 
variables variabilities explain 85 percent of the economic growth variability. Furthermore, the CD tests rejected 
the null hypothesis of the errors terms cross-sectionally weakly dependent. The CD statistics of all models are 
statistically significant. 
Results suggest that when introduced one by one the three candidates political indicators, only rule of 
law affects directly economic growth. It's coefficient is 0.0128 and is statistically significant at 5 percent. This 
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implies that the short-run real gross domestic product per capita semi-elasticity to rule of law in the WAEMU 
region is 0.0128 and the long-run one is 0.06 [0.0128/(1-0.786)]. The direct effect hypothesis is valid with the 
rule of law indicator, but not with the political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, and voice and 
accountability. This result indicates that investing in the rule of law increases economic growth in the WAEMU, 
while political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, and voice and accountability have no direct effect 
on economic growth in this zone. 
As Haggard and Tieda (2011) pointed out, the rule of law is a multidimensional concept. Investing in 
the rule of law framework implies that the most of it discrete components improve, such as violence, security of 
person, property rights and the institutions required to enforce them, such as government and judicial 
independence. These aspects are fundamental in the total factor productivity growth and the economic growth 
process because the law does not only regulate economic activity but also provide it foundation. 
However, Ramanujan et al. (2012), based on five components related to the rule of law: governance, 
institutions, the judiciary, corruption, and media and civil society, demonstrate that there are no clear answers or 
obvious interpretations to the complex relationship between rule of law and economic development in the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries. 
Results also show that physical and human capital are positively related to the economic growth in the 
WAEMU. Their coefficient are statically significant and averaged to 0.006 for the gross capital formation, and 
0.0004 for the enrollment rate of primary education. These imply that the short-run semi-elasticity of WAEMU 
countries's real GDP per capita to physical and human capital are 0.006 and 0.0004, respectively, and the long-
run semi-elasticity are 0.03 [0.006/(1-0.8)], and [0.0004/(1-0.8)], respectively. These finds are in the favor of the 
endogenous economic growth theoretical predictions. 
Table 1: Political Institutions and Economic Growth direct effect Results 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
L.log_gdpc 0.796*** 0.805*** 0.786*** 0.804*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0560) (0.0553) (0.0580) 
Ck 0.000655* 0.000694** 0.000543 0.000649* 
 (0.000335) (0.000329) (0.000340) (0.000331) 
Hc 0.000433** 0.000431** 0.000411** 0.000397* 
 (0.000208) (0.000212) (0.000203) (0.000206) 
Pop 0.00601 0.000977 0.00211 0.00443 
 (0.00535) (0.00582) (0.00521) (0.00611) 
Pol_stab  0.00358   
  (0.00263)   
Ru_law   0.0128**  
   (0.00497)  
Voi_acc    0.00328 
    (0.00615) 
Constant 0.836** 0.745** 0.735** 0.807** 
 (0.354) (0.369) (0.345) (0.350) 
Observations 126 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.854 0.856 0.859 0.854 
F-statistic 155.57*** 135.67*** 145.39*** 135.18*** 
CD test-statistic 2.30** 2.51** 2.72*** 2.30** 
Number of groups 7 7 7 7 
Source: Author's estimation. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
About the second hypothesis, checking for the indirect effect of the political institutions to the 
economic growth, by interbreeding political variables and physical and human capital, results indicate the three 
political indicators are indirectly related to economic growth. Their coefficient are statistically significant. 
All the three political variables affect positively economic growth through human capital, and 
negatively trough physical capital. The final indirect economic gowth effect are negative for all variables due to 
the relative magnitudes of the physical capital indicator (negative) and the human capital variables (positive). 
The coefficient of political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, rule of law, and voice and 
accountability are -0.0007, -0.001, and -0.001, respectively, for physical capital, and 0.0002, 0.0004, and 0.0005, 
respectively, for the human capital. 
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Table 2: Political Institutions and Economic Growth indirect effect Results 
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
L.log_gdpc 0.869*** 0.893*** 0.894*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0516) (0.0503) 
Pop -0.000119 -0.00132 0.000802 
 (0.00628) (0.00569) (0.00558) 
Ck*Pol_stab -0.000734**   
 (0.000300)   
Hc*Pol_stab 0.000211***   
 (7.77e-05)   
Ck*Ru_law  -0.00128***  
  (0.000450)  
Hc*Ru_law  0.000445***  
  (0.000118)  
Ck*Voi_acc   -0.00118** 
   (0.000509) 
Hc*Voi_acc   0.000472*** 
   (0.000138) 
Constant 0.0985 -0.155 0.0746 
 (0.208) (0.184) (0.172) 
Observations 126 126 126 
R-squared 0.842 0.851 0.851 
F-statistic 161.81*** 137.43*** 148.59*** 
CD test-statistic 2.74*** 2.26** 1.82* 
Number of groups 7 7 7 
Source: Author's estimation. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4. Conclusion 
In the economic literature, political institutions are recently pointed out as one of the important factors in the 
economic growth process. Despite existent theoretical models predictions and empirical results are ambiguous 
when analyzing the relationship between political institutions and economic growth, there is little research that 
has attempted to examine this relationship in the WAEMU. 
This article investigates in the WAEMU the direct and indirect economic growth effect of three political 
indicators: Political stability and absence of violence and terrorism, rule of law, and voice and accountability. 
The methodological approach is based on the dynamic panel augmented Solow model in the style of Jones 
(2015), but with the dynamic common correlated effects. The Dynamic Common Correlated Mean Group 
Estimator proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2015) are performed. 
Results show that investing in the rule of law increases economic growth in the WAEMU, wile political 
stability and absence of violence and terrorism, and voice and accountability have no direct effect on economic 
growth in this zone. 
About the indirect effect through physical and human capital, results indicate that political variables 
affect positively economic through human capital and negatively through physical capital. The final indirect 
effect are negative due to the dominant relative magnitudes effect of physical capital (negative) on the human 
capital effect (positive). 
These find imply that to increase economic growth, WAEMU countries must not only make effort to 
improve the overall political index but also pay attention to the components in favor of physical capital such as 
corruption, property rights and judicial independence. 
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Appendix: Definitions and Sources of Variables 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Real Gross Domestic Product per 
capita in the logarythm form 
Log_gdpc = Ln (gross domestic product at constant 
price (base = 2010) / population) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Population growth rate Pop = Population growth rate 
Physical capital Ck = Gross capital formation 
Human capital Hc = Enrollment rate of primary education 
Political stability and absence of 
violence and terrorism 
Pol_Stab = Political stability and absence of 
violence and terrorism index estimation 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
Rule of law Ru_Law = Rule of law index estimation 
Voice and accountability 
Voi_Acc = Voice and accountability index 
estimation 
Source: Author 
  
